





A Privacy Calculus Model for Contact Tracing Apps: Analyzing the German Corona-Warn-App

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Agenda



- Introduction / Motivation
- Research Model / Hypotheses
- Methodology
- Results
- Limitations
- Conclusion and Future Work



Introduction



- Contact Tracing App in Germany
 - Covid-19
- Functionality
 - Contact tracing
 - Registration of positive tests
- Long discussion between experts
 - Centralised / decentralised
 - PEPP-PT / DP3T
- Mixed media echo



- 45 Million downloads (Apr 22)
- Meanwhile new functions
 - Vaccination certificates
 - Statistics
 - Event check-ins

Motivation

- Privacy concerns one major barrier for acceptance of contact tracing apps
 - Previous studies are based on intention not on actual usage
 - some of them even with hypothetical scenarios
- Citizens' decision important
 - CWA voluntary in Germany
- Privacy calculus theory
 - Suitable framework to explain
 - Used with APCO model

Horstmann, K.T., Buecker, S., Krasko, J., Kritzler, S., Terwiel, S.: Who does or does not use the 'corona-warn-app'and why? European Journal of Public Health 31(1), 49–51 (2021)








Research Model





Hypotheses




			Demographic Variables ¹ H1a-H1d Smartphone Experience
	Relation	Effect	Perceived Benefits of CWA
H1a	Age \rightarrow PC	positive	Mobile OS Experience
H1b	Gender \rightarrow PC	female > male	Notes: 1) Age, gender, education, incom
H1c	Education \rightarrow PC	negative	
H1d	Income \rightarrow PC	negative	
H2	Smartphone Exp \rightarrow PC	positive	
H3	Mobile OS Exp \rightarrow PC	positive	
H4	PC → USE	negative	
H5	PB → USE	positive	
H6	Trust → PC	negative	
H7	Trust → USE	positive	

Methodology

- Questionnaire
 - Privacy Concerns (based on Gu et al.)
 - Perceived Benefits (based on Champion)
 - Trust in the German healthcare system
- Data Collection (N=1752), January 2021
 - Sampled for 3 dimensions
 - Age (EUROSTAT 2018)
 - Gender (EUROSTAT 2018)
 - CWA-Users / non-Users
 - Statistically significant but small differences
 - Income [median =]
 - Education [median ≈]
 - Experience in Smartphones [8.77 vs. 8.35 years]

Demographics	Ν	%
Age		
18-29 years	371	21.17%
30-39 years	316	18.04%
40-49 years	329	18.78%
50-59 years	431	24.60%
60 years and older	305	17.41%
Net income		
500€_ 1000€	160	0 13%

500€- 1000€	$160\ 9.13\%$
1000€- 2000€	$402\ 22.95\%$
2000€- 3000€	$404\ 23.06\%$
3000€- 4000€	$314\ 17.92\%$
More than $4000 \in$	$292 \ 16.67\%$
Prefer not to say	$180\;10.27\%$



Demographics	Ν	%
Gender		
Female	894	51.03%
Males	853	48.69%
Diverse	4	0.23%
Prefer not to say	1	0.06%

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Education

1	No degree	8	0.46%
2	Secondary school	187	10.67%
3	Secondary school $^+$	574	32.76%
4	A levels	430	24.54%
5	Bachelor's degree	240	13.70%
6	Master's degree	285	16.27%
7	Doctorate	28	1.60%


+5 GCSEs at grade C and above


Gu, J., Xu, Y.C., Xu, H., Zhang, C., Ling, H.: Privacy concerns for mobile app download: An elaboration likelihood model perspective. Decision Support Systems 94, 19–28 (2017)


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Privacy Concerns, Perceived Benefits & Trust







Variables are significantly different between users and non-users with moderate effect sizes r for

- Privacy concerns (r=-0.540)
- Perceived benefits (r= 0.553)
- Trust (r= 0.258)


Perceived Benefits

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Model Assessment



- Measurement Model
 - Internal consistency reliability (ICR)
 - Cronbach's Alpha ✓
 - Composite reliability \checkmark
 - Convergent Validity
 - Average variance extracted \checkmark
 - Discriminant Validity
 - Fornell-Larcker criterion ✓
 - Heterotrait-monotrait ratio ✓
 - Common Method Bias
 - Harman's single-factor test ✓
- Structural Model Assessment
 - Collinearity
 - Variance inflation factor √
 - Significance and Relevance of Model Relationships
 - adjusted R²
 - Privacy concerns: 16.6%
 - USE: 40.7%



1) Age, gender, education, income



Results



				Demographic Variables ¹ H1a-H1d Smartphone Experience
	Relation	Path Est.		Perceived Benefits of CWA H5 Use of CWA
H1a	Age \rightarrow PC	-0.039		Mobile OS Experience
H1b	Gender \rightarrow PC	-0.017		Notes: 1) Age, gender, education, income
H1c	Education \rightarrow PC	-0.097***	1	
H1d	Income \rightarrow PC	-0.045*	✓	Privacy calculus theory / APCO model supported
H2	Smartphone Exp \rightarrow PC	-0.050		 Privacy Concerns + Perceived Benefits influence USE
H3	Mobile OS Exp \rightarrow PC	0.055		Education and Income minor antecedents
H4	PC → USE	-0.378***	1	
H5	PB → USE	0.395***	1	Trust in Healthcare important antecedent
H6	Trust \rightarrow PC	-0.374***	 Image: A second s	 Trust in Healthcare has negative effect on USE
H7	Trust → USE	-0.054*	X	

Limitations

- Results can not easily be generalized for other contact tracing apps
- Based on self-reports
 - But real use instead of intention (+ virtual scenarios)
- Research followed original APCO model
 - Interactions between antecedents not considered
 - Demographic effects on perceived benefits not considered
- Potential biases due to social desirability, mood, translation of the questionnaire's items





Conclusion & Future Work

- One of the first studies investigating use behaviour
- Non surprisingly, non-users have
 - Higher privacy concerns
 - Lower perceived benefits
- Communication strategy important
- Investigate Antecedents of
 - Perceived Benefits
- Investigate other factors
 - Political Opinion
 - Social influence











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Questions

AGE in years

prefer not to say)



Demographics

Privacy Concerns

- Smartphone Experience in years
- Mobile OS Experience in years •
- USE Corona-Warn-App user (yes/no) .

Privacy concerns related to the Corona-Warn-App

EDU Education (no degree, secondary school, secondary school

INCOME of household (in e: 0.5k-1k, 1k-2k, 2k-3k, 3k-4k, >4k,

(>5 GCSE), A levels, bachelor, master, doctorate)

GDR Gender (female, male, divers, prefer not to say)

- PC1 I think the Corona-Warn-App over-collects my personal information.
- PC2 I worry that the Corona-Warn-App leaks my personal information to third-parties.
- **PC3** I am concerned that the Corona-Warn-App violates my privacy.
- **PC4** I am concerned that the Corona-Warn-App misuses my personal information.
- PC5 I think that the Corona-Warn-App collects my location data.

Perceived benefits of the Corona-Warn-App

- PB1 Using the Corona-Warn-App makes me feel safer.
- **PB2** I have a lot to gain by using the Corona-Warn-App.
- PB3 The Corona-Warn-App can help me to identify contacts to infected individuals.
- Perceived Benefits PB4 If I use the Corona-Warn-App I am able to warn others in case I aminfected with Covid-19.
- PB5 The spreading of Covid-19 in Germany can be decelerated by using the Corona-Warn-App.

Trust in the German healthcare system

- TRUST1 The German healthcare system is trustworthy.
- **TRUST2** The players acting in the German healthcare system are trustworthy.
- **TRUST3** The German healthcare system can cope with the burden of Covid19 infections.

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